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In the United States, involuntary hospitalisation of the mentally ill through the 
civil commitment process results in a curtailment of the fundamental liberty interest 
of freedom from external restraint; part of the constitutional guarantee.  Apart from 
the loss of freedom through physical confinement, the labelling that inevitably 
accompanies commitment can give rise to significant social stigma and restricted life 
chances. In the last fifty-years, the power of doctors to commit on a best interests 
basis has been replaced by a legal process in which the grounds for involuntary 
hospitalisation have been restricted and the rights of patients prioritised.  The 
problems inherent to both models have led to the development of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in which the therapeutic possibilities of law and the legal process are 
studied with the aim of optimising the therapeutic outcomes of commitment.  Any 
model of involuntary hospitalisation necessarily gives rise to basic philosophical and 
political questions about the nature of individual liberty, of freedom and of the 
relationship between the individual and the state. As historically contingent concepts, 
what meaning can be attached to them and the goal of striving for a better balance in 
the context of the mentally ill between freedom and coercion?  
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Jurisprudence Model’
In Alan Bennett’s play The History Boys, Irwin, a sixth-form history tutor destined for 
a media career (based, it is rumoured, on that specialist in historical controversy Niall 
Ferguson) sets out his views on how a difficult  change in the law that will  affect 
individual  rights  should  be  dealt  with.   The  tactic  Irwin  advocates  is  for  the 
Government to insist that the new Bill, rather than reducing the liberty of the subject 
“amplifies it.” The use of paradox, notes Irwin, “works well … the loss of liberty is 
the price we pay for freedom type thing.” (Bennett 2004, 3).
Thus, in a few sentences, Bennett encapsulates one of the greatest, or, at least, what 
we in the West have come to think of as one of the greatest, of political questions of 
this  or  of  any time;  the  contest  between  liberty  and  restraint,  between  force  and 
freedom –  how best  to  govern  so  as  to  maximise  (individual)  liberty?   What  is 
memorable about the passage is that Bennett achieves this in terms at once familiar 
and, importantly, mystifying.  Note that the sentence works as sophistry only because 
the word “freedom” is substituted for that of “liberty”, as if the two were conceptually 
separable.  Indeed, there is paradox in the simple sense of contradiction only if the 
terms share a common meaning. At the same time, our sense of the ambiguity of the 
terms allows for an alternate, more complex sense of paradox, of that which appears 
to be nonsensical but which is actually possible or true. This causes us to hesitate.  If 
the  terms  really  do  express  different  concepts,  could one  increase  freedom  by 
reducing  liberty?  Isn’t  there,  anyway,  a  part  of  us  that  intuits  that  freedom must 
somehow be a limited thing, that freedom cannot be absolute for, if it  were, what 
meaning would it have? If limited, what are its limits and what is the nature of any 
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constraints?  Then  again,  if  the  terms  cannot  be  differentiated,  is  there  a  single 
definition that we could agree on?  If so, might this not then be subject to multiple 
interpretations – interpretations as to how freedom is to be realised – each dependent 
on differing sets of values, values that might also change over time?  Moreover, even 
if  we were to  agree on a meaning,  is  freedom necessarily a good thing as seems 
usually to be assumed?  Come to think of it, didn’t someone once write a book telling 
us that, having abandoned God, we are naturally afraid of freedom and try to escape 
it?  
Amused by the satire, we are left uneasy by the thought that perhaps, in the 
mouths of politicians, the terms have been rendered meaningless: the political gold of 
the post-Enlightenment Klondike long since beaten to transparency by the claims of 
countless,  frequently  contradictory  interests.  Perhaps.  But  liberty  and  freedom, 
whatever the terms may mean, remain at the centre of Western political philosophy 
and of liberal law – most obviously so American law. Undeniably essential elements 
of the “grand narrative” of our system of democracy,  fundamental  components  of 
Western dreamtime,  the central  tenets  of our creation myth  and, despite  the odds, 
rather  like  a  certain  much  overused  four-letter  Anglo-Saxon expletive,  terms  that 
remain imbued with extraordinary power,  with emotional  resonance,  perhaps most 
strongly so – another paradox – when we genuinely don’t know what they mean.
But  let’s  clarify  for  a  moment  and  take  philosophical  stock  (except 
grammatically in the sense of permission) the terms are not distinguishable, formal 
definition is possible (although how many types of liberty is still debated) – rather, it 
is the differing means of achieving liberty that give rise to confusion and argument 
(contrast  for  a  moment  laissez-faire  libertarian  individualism,  in  which  liberty  is 
essentially an expression of economic choice and private ownership, and Marxism 
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where liberty is a function of consciousness raising: we become free by understanding 
that we are determined.  “He has most toys wins” versus the inevitability of historical 
materialism
). This is a problem. Indeed, because liberty remains  the concept of our times it is 
arguably also the problem of our times. One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s 
terrorist type thing …
It is arguable that of all areas of black letter law, that governing mental illness 
forces us to consider problems of liberty in the most searching of ways.  It is the area 
most  obviously concerned with both the outward and inward, what are sometimes 
called  the  interpersonal  and  intrapersonal,  senses  of  liberty  and  their  loss.i For 
example,  mental illness that renders one incapable of making decisions or of self-
mastery  as  compared  to  physical  restraint,  incarceration  and  enforced  treatment 
decisions. But there are other reasons too.  Whatever the truth of such perceptions or 
our devotion to rational and dispassionate assessment, there is no escaping the fact 
that mental health law has baggage: the mistakes of the past, an abiding sense that 
much mental illness is not well understood, the horror of labelling and dread of losing 
one’s identity.  Overlaying these is the fact that apart from crime, mental health is the 
one aspect of behaviour that can lead to incarceration (and much else) most often 
through  no  fault  of  the  individual.    Arguably,  it  is  the  involuntary  aspect  of 
interaction between the individual and the state – coercion absent fault – with all its 
implications for the preservation of liberty that gives most alarm; the double sense in 
which my being free necessitates being myself.          
In  his  examination  of  involuntary commitment  in  the  United States,  Bruce 
Winick offers an eloquent challenge to the currently dominant legal model by arguing 
the cause of therapeutic jurisprudence.  For those unfamiliar with the term, therapeutic 
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jurisprudence is a multi-disciplinary approach (involving psychology and the social 
sciences) that seeks to reveal both the anti-therapeutic and therapeutic effects of law, 
its institutions and legal actors with a view to law reform.   Thus, in Winick’s text,  
jurisprudence is  applied both in its  empirical  sociological  sense and as conceptual 
analysis  and  clarification.  In  respect  of  commitment,  the  aim  of  therapeutic 
jurisprudence is to promote a more balanced approach than that achieved either by the 
medical model that dominated prior to the 1960’s or the legal model that followed it. 
As what he terms a “scholarly approach”, Winick is at pains to stress that the goal is 
to  facilitate,  where  suitable,  greater  harmony  between  medical  and  legal 
considerations so that therapeutic outcomes are improved (Winick 2005, 7). To move 
away, in other words, from a situation in which a presumption is made that either 
medical or legal considerations must necessarily be privileged.  The greater part of the 
book is thus dedicated to detailed and extensive consideration of the law and practices 
relevant to civil commitment and the ways in which therapeutic jurisprudence might 
helpfully be brought to bear upon them.  Much of this discussion is quite dense and is 
obviously informed by an expert understanding of three key aspects: the law, practice 
and the professional literature.  For example, Chapter 4, dealing with incompetency 
and how it should be defined and determined, is an impressive treatment of all three 
aspects and ends by arguing for the adoption of a presumption of competence in line 
with present American trends and the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence. What is 
welcome, particularly in an American text, is Winick’s application of his subject to a 
consideration  of  international  human  rights  and their  implications  for  involuntary 
treatment. 
Throughout,  the  footnoting  demonstrates  not  only  Winick’s  wide  research 
base but also his substantial contributions to the area of mental health law.  Indeed, 
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some might buy the book for the footnoting resource alone.  It must be said too that, 
despite the density of information, Winick’s writing style is very easy.  It is a function 
of his understanding of the issues that Winick is able to present them so clearly and 
palatably. Moreover, despite its scholarship, this is a book suitable to a wide range of 
professionals; on the whole, no one need fear that a lack of particular expertise will 
confound their understanding – nearly everything that requires explanation receives it. 
The only caveat for a non-American readership is that although Winick’s discussion 
of  case  and  statute  law  is  admirably  clear,  some  procedural  knowledge  of  the 
American legal system might prove helpful.  
The success of the book’s construction and execution is marred only by some 
unevenness.   In seeking comprehensiveness  in  his  treatment  of the subject  and to 
apply therapeutic jurisprudence to all key areas of civil commitment, an essentially 
scholarly approach might be expected to fit a little awkwardly with the more practical 
aspects of the legal process. An example is a section discussing the role of counsel in 
Chapter  6  that  deals  with  the  application  of  civil  commitment  criteria.  Although 
espousing much good sense, one cannot escape the thought that some of what Winick 
says here should (one hopes, would) occur to any sensitive and dedicated practitioner 
working  in  the  field,  even  in  other  fields.  The  tone  in  places  appears  slightly 
unfortunate; that the patient should not be treated as invisible, that language should 
avoid professional jargon, that a sense of optimism should be conveyed and that the 
judge should convey the impression that what the patient has said is important, may 
be observations of best practice but carry overtones of the paternalistic, even of mild 
condescension,  that  one imagines  the  therapeutic  approach should  strive to  avoid. 
However,  an alternative  reading  would  be  to  take  these  recommendations  at  face 
value.  It is clear from many of Winick’s observations that the standard of mental 
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health advocacy and procedure in the United States is sometimes very questionable: 
the level of detailed commentary in Winick’s account suggests just how questionable. 
Those  familiar  with  American  legal  theory  will  know  that  the  attempt  to 
understand law through consideration of legal practice, clinical legal education and 
the  beginnings  of  sociological  jurisprudence  are  all  traceable  to  American  legal 
realism.  Not for nothing that the phrase, “we are all realists now” is repeated still in 
the law schools of American universities. It is not too fanciful to say that elements of 
therapeutic  jurisprudence might  have very distant  connections  with such works as 
Jerome Frank’s  Law and the Modern Mind, a realist work born from Frank’s long 
period  of  psychoanalysis  (Frank,  1930).  However,  rather  than  merely  drawing 
disputable  equivalences,  the  more  serious  point,  one  that  takes  us  back  to  the 
discussion of liberty, is to recognise that legal theory can be viewed as part of the 
history  of  ideas,  ideas  not  necessarily  limited  to  those  subjects  most  directly 
connected with law.  The realists recognised that the modern university law school 
offered opportunities  to  draw on established academic  disciplines  like  history and 
philosophy as well as new disciplines such as anthropology and psychology in the 
analysis and teaching of law and by so doing invented the multi-disciplinary approach 
to legal education.  The inheritors of that tradition in the United States, the critical 
legal  scholars  of  the  1980’s,  were  able  to  draw  more  widely  and  in  a  more 
sophisticated way on other disciplines to support one of their central contentions: that 
law is a disguised expression of power.  Much of the analysis of CLS scholars fed on 
the idea that the Western legal tradition was riven by a series of contradictions. The 
best known of these, the so-called fundamental contradiction, was framed by Duncan 
Kennedy,  “most  participants  in  American  legal  culture  believe  that  the  goal  of 
individual  freedom  is  at  the  same  time  dependent  on  and  incompatible  with  the 
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communal  coercive  action  that  is  necessary  to  achieve  it.”  (Kennedy  1979,  211) 
Although  overtaken  by later  postmodernist  argument  and  abandoned  by Kennedy 
himself, the idea, of conflict between liberty and its preservatory mechanisms and of 
law’s function as mediator of that conflict – as “smoother-over” of cracks in the fabric 
of  society – remains  relevant.  At  the very least  it  reminds  us of the need,  in  the 
context of liberal legal theory, of a developed understanding of the concept of liberty,  
of its history and relationship with other ideas as well as of its philosophical basis.
Winick begins his book by stressing the importance at least, of one conception 
of liberty, “Civil commitment imposes on those subjected to it a deprivation of the 
fundamental  liberty interest  in  being  free  of  external  restraint.”  (Winick  2005,  1) 
Elsewhere,  Winick  refers  both  to  liberty  and  self-determination.   Throughout  the 
book, there is considerable and helpful reference to the constitutional framework for 
liberty,  a concept which, as part of the Declaration of Independence of the United 
States, had its origins in natural rights theory. Unsurprisingly, Winick is not insensible 
to the need to examine the philosophical component in more detail.  In Chapter 2, we 
find  a  footnote  referencing  an  article  by  Winick,  On  Autonomy:  Legal  and 
Psychological  Perspectives  written  in  1992  (Winick,  1992).  The  first  part  of  the 
article,  Autonomy in  Legal  and Political  Theory,  deals  in  part  with  philosophical 
foundations before resolving into a discussion of how the principle of autonomy was 
incorporated into legal doctrine through the constitutional principle of due process. 
The philosophical section initially describes a familiar descriptive arc: discussion of 
Lockean natural rights and their use by Jefferson, the creation of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights is followed by consideration of consequentialism (Mill, Bentham) 
and  deontological  theory  (Kant).  The  only  link  offered  by  Winick  between 
discussions of constitutionalism and the later philosophical commentary is that the 
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notion  of  individual  autonomy  “is  at  the  core  of  two  major  ethical  traditions  in 
modern  Western  philosophy”  (Winick  1992,  1712).  This  historical  overview thus 
offers us two conceptions  of liberty.  Mill’s  self-determination (autonomy)  and the 
idea of the core of privacy into which the state cannot intrude, and Kant’s principle of 
individuals as ends in themselves.  The latter is a Pandora’s box raising a number of 
difficulties, not least the fact that the fragmentary Kantian conception of personhood 
sits rather uncomfortably with the stable liberal individual of modernism. More than 
this, part of what we derive from Kant takes us back to the kinds of problem with 
which we began: how to be free when we are not free?  In the conclusion to the article 
Winick reflects on the limitations of our idealised model of individual autonomy as 
“inconsistent with psychological realities and largely artificial” (Winick 1992, 1769). 
More than this, Winick explicitly acknowledges many of the ways in which the liberal 
circle  must  somehow  be  squared:  the  conflict  between  individualism  and 
interdependence, the difficulty of drawing a boundary between individual choice in 
the pursuit of happiness and the role of the state.  About all of this Winick takes a 
pragmatic view, the political conception of the rational individual as decision maker is 
“a useful foundation upon which to base a legal system” (Winick 1992, 1769).  The 
paradox  here  of  course  is  that  whilst  liberalism  insists  on  us  being  free,  distinct 
individuals, liberal law, through the concept of formal equality, aims to treat us as all 
the same.   
American history provides us with a wealth of examples of the ways in which 
conceptions of liberty and the value and possibilities of self-determination shift  in 
response  to  economic,  political  and  sociological  factors,  a  phenomenon  to  which 
psychiatry  has,  arguably,  also  contributed.  Consider  for  a  moment  the  complex 
interplay, argued for in a recent documentary, between the work of R D Laing and D 
PPP0245 Winick review 02.doc 10
Winick review
L Rosenhan in discrediting  conventional  psychiatry,  the  influence  of  the  Austrian 
School  of Economics  through the work of Frederick von Hayek,  Robert  Nozick’s 
libertarianism,  game  theory,  the  development  of  public  choice  theory  and  the 
challenge to state institutions and the notion of the public good, all of which helped 
bring about a new emphasis on individuals conceived as rational and self-interested 
consumers in which the market, once again, became pre-eminent: more, some felt, a 
tumbling backwards into the 18th century than a leap forward into the 21st  (Curtis, 
2007).
The purpose of these reflections  is  to help,  in a very limited sense,  not to 
answer but to throw light on the question posed at the start – how best to govern so as 
to maximise liberty? A question that at one level, trusting Winick will forgive this 
rather  crude act of reductionism, is that at  which his work is  aimed.   The central 
difficulty in addressing it is that liberalism is an ideology of extraordinary complexity 
– for one thing, its capacity for containment of dramatically contradictory positions 
defies attempts to delineate it satisfactorily. Consider for a moment that the work of 
Nozick in Anarchy State and Utopia is celebrated by right-wing liberal adherents to 
an  extreme  form economic  individualism  which  perceived  taxation  as  a  form of 
slavery  and  is  intolerant  of  anything  more  than  the  night-watchman  state 
(psychologically  potent  for  country  which  perceives  a  strong  divide  between  the 
public and private law), whilst at the same time it is decried by left-wing liberals who 
believe in establishing state mechanisms for the achievement  of social  justice and 
substantive equality.  A commitment simply to liberty can only serve to raise a whole 
series  of  associated  questions.  At  best  we  may  say  that,  “the  metaphysical  and 
ontological  core  of  liberalism is  individualism”,  and thus  a  point  of  agreed value 
amongst liberals (Arblaster 1984, 66). To this we must add respect for freedom. As 
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suggested  above,  one  facet  of  the  genius  of  liberalism has  been to  accommodate 
wildly different conceptions of how freedom is to be achieved and to find the means 
to mediate between them. What it really means to be self-determining or free from 
external restraint in our society is open to debate.    
To  return  to  Irwin’s  quip  that  the  loss  of  liberty  is  the  price  we  pay  for 
freedom, we might, with due caution, now attempt a different reading: that in seeking 
to remove freedom we must act so as to maximise the chances of preserving it. That 
this  is  not a  paradox  is  something  we  can  valuably  learn  from  Bruce  Winick’s 
powerful exposition of therapeutic jurisprudence, that we can accept the use of the 
term  “freedom”  as  meaningful  is  something  we  must  attribute  to  the  genius  of 
liberalism.     
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